It is somehow strange that. throug bout the recent work on semantic memory, the study of learning has been slighted.
The term "learning" has fallen into disuse, 'replaced by vague references to "adquisaion of information in Memory." It iseasy to fall into the trap of believing that the learning of some topic is no more than the acquisition of the appropriate set of statements about the topic by the mtmL!, system. According to this simple view of things, to have learned sometn lg well is to be ableto retrieve it from memory At an appropriate time. We believe this view is much too simple.
Learningcan be more than the simple acquisition of statements.
We believe it is time to examine learning again, to evaluate just what does happenwhen people acquire the information about a topic and use, it appropriately.
The study of learningdiffers from the study ofmemory in its emphasis, not necessarily in content. Learningandemory are intimately intertwined, and it is not possible to understand one without understvding the other. Complex learning appears to have an emergent quality. This learning seems to involve a modification of .the organizahonal structures of Memoryas well as the accumulation of factsoabout the topic under study. 'At times this modification of the organizational structure seems to be accompanied by a "cliCk of,comprehension," a reasonably strong_feeling of insight, or understanding of a tc3piC that makes a large body of previously acquired (but ill structured) information fit into place. Thus, the study of the' 4 .; learning of complex topics is related to the study of the uuderstanding of complex topics.
THis paper-does not satisfy our desire for increased knowledge about the process of learning. Instead we simply hope to whet the-appetite of our audience (and of ourselves). We present an analysis of learning and memory, attempting to examine some possible% conceptualizations of the learning process, hoping thereby to guide the research of future years.
We ourselveS are just beginning the,study of learning, and the start has proven frusteetinglyelusive. Indeed, 'it is the very elusiveness dhathas given rise to this paper. We now realize that simple characterizations of the learning process will notdo. In thilipapr we attempt a coherent account of the process of learning within our conceptualizations of a theory of long-term memoiythe theory we have called active structural networks (cf. Norman, Rumelhart aud LNR, 1975 Upon having developed-a set,of categories-af interpretation (as you will see below, we call these schemata) these categories presumably .undergo ceintinual tuning or minor modification to bring them more in congruence with the functional demands placed on these-,categories.
Thus, for example, when we fitst-learn to type we develop a set of response routines to carry out the tak. As we become, an increasingly better typist, these response routines become tuned to the.task and we come to be able to perform it more ea.sily and effectively. Presumably and analogous phenolenon is going,hon as a young Child learns tfiat not all animals are-"doggies."
Slowly his "doggie" schema becomes modified inito'tconquence-with the actual demancIs on his interpretation system. Memory contains a record of our:experiences. Some of the information is particular to -the sit'uation that it represents. Other informat ion .is more Seneral, representing abstraction of the knbwledge* of particular sfvuations lo a) class of situati n .
The meMory of eating dinner yesterday represents particular inforthation. ,Knowledge hat people eat meals from plates (using knives, forksand spoons),reptes nts general information
. that applies to a large class pf situations.
A psychblogical theory of memory must be capable'of representkng both general 'and perticular information.
We belieVe thit general information is best represent*d through organized information unite--that we call In.some sense, one'could consider schemata th represent prototypes. / of concepts.
A.General Sche00 :have substituted constants for t ese variables; Jowever, 1g someviar blessuchasland,machinery,andbuildings are si411 unspecified.
Our general knowledge of carrots.will tell us something of, the size of the farm and the kinds of machinery likely to be involved. Our schema for the growing of plantsIiip tell us.that water and.fertilizer are required. Our general schema for farthing still has some free varilbles but these are not without some'constraint: we expect that there will be some animals, probably cow, chiCkens, horses and pigs. the :elec-ti,n )1 appropriate configuration of schemata to account tor the ,:ituiti)n.
This means that there will be some initials,selection of schemlta and verifiItl in or rejection .tf the choices.
A major ,r-or:ini ot the processIrg eftort involved in mprehension is directjd toward determinim:
the appropriate schemata for representing the situation. Once an appropriate -r configuration of schemata have be0Wfound, the constants of the situation have to be associated with (bound to) the variables of the schema.
The
.schema that is selected will determine the interpretation of the situation and will direct processing attention to selected aspects of the situation.
Different schemata will thereby. yield different interpretations of the same situation, and different features of a situation will take on more or les'; importance as a function of that interpretation.
-1.ike a theory, schemata will vary in adequacy with which they accoune for any given situation. Schemata will both a'6count for existinynputs can then be introduced into the data pile for uslby other schemata.
Perhaps the best way to view this LF to think of all the data being written on a blackboard, with the schethata examining the blackboard for data relevant to themselvel. When a schema sees someting, it a':..tempt$ to integrate the data into its organizational structure, and then puts new information onto the blackboard. Other schemata may react to-these new data.
Thus, schemata are data driven in the sense that they respond to the Cxistence of relevant data. Schemata perform conceptually driven guidance4-5 the processing by using their internal conceptualizations to add new data to the blackboard, thereby guiding the processing of other This islearnipg by accretion: learning by adding new data structures totheexisting data baseo emory, followingtheorganizationalrAdypresent.
Learning byaccret ion is th atural side effect of the comprehension process.
In it, we .tore s.A erpr'ation of the actual experience. If later we retrieve the stored informa,5lion, 'we ute the instanSated schemata to reconstruct the.ofiginal trience, thereby "remembering" that experience.
The schemat.a guide reconstruction in much the same way that they guide original comprehension. Accretion, and later retrieval through reconstruction, is the normal process of learning. It is tie sort of learning that has traditionally been studied },14y psychologistsjand it is most appropriate to the current developments in the study of memory.
Learning through the accumulation of Note that this is creation of a new sche a by generalizing an old one.
The modificatiol involves replacing a constant term of the square schema (the rightanglesAilthecorner) with vayiables to producp a new,Moregeneral .7c1iema.
Patterned schema generation can'also occur through modifying old schemata, replacing some of the variable components of,a schema with constants.
11Als, for example, we might very well 'form the concept of a "cocker spaniel" 4 by modifying the schema for "dog." In this case we would pattern the cockcr spaniel schema on*he dog schema,.but with Certain-variables much p.
morc tiF:htly specified. that normally apg14;44Can be discovd anid added to the specification Of the schema.. Whenever a part ic ar variable is not spec ified , the de f au 1 t valueOrovide intelligent guesses that can be used in making inferences and guiding further procesing.°M c.. adjustment of variable constraints must be an important mechanism of learning. The Chi will, however'also generate words like oneth, twoth, thredth, fiveth etc. Tne child has too broad a ,rule: thellrule over regularized.
4
The ch'ild must tune the general,rule so that it has the correct constraints # on its applicability. The vocess whereby the restrictions are learned involves adj ting the variables of the schema to permi,t,its invocation only for the.appropriate conditions. The schema.must be tuned to improve itc accuracy of applizcation.
. Tuning to generalize the applicability. Bowerman (in press) reports that 0 young.children u §e action words first only about themselves, then later generalize them to other people and animlils, and finally use them for inanimate objects as wg_11.
This would appear to be a case where the Ohema must be tuned,by/loosening the variable cOnstraints to make-it A more generarly applicable.
Generalization of schemata occurs when an existing schema is modified F' so as to apply to a wider range. Ope example is when the meaning of a term is extended to cover other cases. This.process,.called metaphorical extension by Gentndr (1975) was illustrated by her use of the word "have" in the following examples:
(1) Sam has a 1ar4e kettle.
(2) Sam has a nice apartment, (3) The kettle has an enamel coating. PFC..441mab1y the verb "have" gets a 4Wmary mesning of something like "own."
By.extetvion, aspects of the owning relationship:become inessentia to the application of the concept of "having." Originally "have" would seem.,to require the owner to be one with complete conirol Ove'r the object in question. , A , As the usage 6ts extended,the requirement of having complete control is looenijdntil finally, by sentence (4) it appears to require only.that the objEct. n quest,ipn be strongly Sg ciated7 in.some way,.with the subject.
Although it is much more comm n in langjage acquisition to find cases of children overgenerdlizing a concept, fch then must be restricted in its ' rangefof application, there ar cases repo ted in which children first over-restrict the application of a term and then must generalize its use to .
the entire conceptual category. Thus, Dale (1976) reports a case in which a child first applied the word "muffin" to oniy blueberries and blueberry muffids, but not to other muffins.
The 'process he extended to other muffins involves gene the wor8 comes to zation of schemata.
In general, reasoning by analogy would seem to involve the generalization a schema.
In this case, one, schema that is,applicable in one domain L. extended to a new domain by modifying one or more of its elements, but m;.:11Laining the bulk of its internal structure. Thus, fog-example, when.
we consider fog "creeping.on little cat';\1)aws,r" the "creep" schema must somehow be exten ed to fog. Although thi's extension probably doesn't involve much learning, it follows the same principles'that we have inmind.'
Tuning to !4,pecilize applicability.
, A common occurrence inthe chiLd's acquisition of language is to overgeneralize,,,the words, to use one word for ajnuch larger set of circumstances thah is appropriate. Thus, a child may call all sthall anim4,41s "doggie," or all humans "mamma," Clark (1973) 2 2 -20-) summarizes much of the literature on this phenomenon. Overgeneralization probably occurs because the chird has selected too features to identify-..the csoncept, so man); things vall satisfy the definition. The cifild must ...1/4e4,Nec alize ts uriderstanding of,,the schema by e ther restricting the' range of he variable terms or by adding some more terms that must he followed, before the schema is acceptable. Specializatie by the first method fits our notion of"tuning. Specialization by the second actually would beya form of patterned generation of schemata: forming a new schema based upon , the old, but modified by adding a few,more terms.
Children may lealin to use the term "ball" to apply to all small objeolks.
)
They must learn to restrict die class of objects to Which the term applie.s.. se alildren first learn to apply eiEher term when the appropriate dimension is in question andyhen learn.to restrict the application of the concepts to the appropriate direction on the dimens o . Again, additional structure is inserted into the relevarschemata.
A similar process may very well be involved in becoming skillful-aE a mntor task. At first when we learn to carry out a cOmplexmotor task th'tre is broad variation in the movements used to accomplish, the task, but with experience in the situkion the variability of the movements is reduced. Consider, as an example, learning.to juggle. At first we
.have great difficulty. We often toss the ball too high or too low. Our catching hand has to reach for the balls as they fall. With practice, our throws become increasingly precise. We come to be able to anticipate
Where the ball will fall with increasing accuracy. It would thus seem that at the early stages of learning to juggle dhe appropriate scheMata 2 3 together.
With practice new constraints are added to our juggle schema and;
'it* bedbmes an increasinglyoprecite, well'tuned schema (see Norman, 1976) .
Learning is not a Unitary Procys%
One najor point of this paper is that learning is nqt a unitary process:
no single mental activity correspodding to learning exists. Learning rakes q place whenever, .people modify their knowledge base, and to single th retical We suspect that schema tuning is also a relatively straightforward operation, one that might not require much different mechanisms than already exist in theories of memory. But the restructuring of memory through the creation of new schemata is quite a different story.-Here we know little of the process whereby this might take place. Moreover, we suspect that tlfeoccaS.ions of schema creation are not frequent. Reorganization of the memory system is not something that should be accomplished lightly. The new structure that should be formed is not easY--todetermine: the entire literature on "insightful" learning and problem solving, on creativity, on discovery learning, etc., can probably becon3idered to be studies of how new schemata get created. We do not believe that the human memory system simply reorganizes itself whenever new. patterns 'are discovered: the discovery of patterns, the matching of analogous schemata to the current situation must probably require considerable analysis. This is the area that we believe requires the most study ih the PA future. This formulation leaves open the question of whether particular represekations result from general schemata, or general schemata from yarticular ones.
It is possible that our early experiences-with some class of events gives rise to a set of particular fepresentations of those events. Then, we gpneralize from these experiences by substituting variables for the aspects of the events that seem to vary with situations, leaving constants (particular concepts) in those parts of the representation that are constant across the different events in the class. The result is a general schema for a class of events. Alternatively, we can take a general schema and apply it to a 4 4 new, particular situation by replacing the variable with constants. We' presume that both of these directions continually take place: general schemata are formed through the process of.generalization of particular instances particular knowledge.is derived from the princfples incorporated within the general schemata.
2.
Note that Otis is a personal 4chema, one relevant to the conceptualizations of one of the authors (DAN) who is horribly ignorant of real farms. .This is proper: schemata within the memory system of a given persOn reflect (constitute) his beliefs and knowledge. A schema may be wholly inaccurate as a description of the world, but it corresponds to the inaccuracies and misconceptions of the possessor of that schema. Assume that the author of this schema learned about farms through nursery rhymes. Note that we are not referring to the concept identification tasks that have been studied within the laboratpr4.
The normal experiments on concept formation probably involve.very little learndng. Probably these tasks have been more concerned with problem solving, where the subjeu6 are asked to discover the rules which properly classify the particular stimulus set under study. Usually, the constraitits specify some reasonable range of alternative concepts that can be used, excluding certain classes and allowing others.
When the constraints arr so restrictive that only a single unique concept can be ued, then this ts the equivalent of having a constant rather than # a variable. In the normal cast, schemata take variables that are partially constrained and thus provide some structure while at the same time representing a reasonable degree of generality.
